

# CAMBRIDGE LIVE LEARNING REVIEW

## Brief

I have been asked by Cambridge City Council (CCC) to undertake an investigation into the events leading to Cambridge Live (CL) being taken back in house by CCC. The purpose of the report is to:

1. Understand the issues that led to the point where CL asked CCC to take services back
2. Record any learning that is available to future officers and councillors

I was asked to focus on

- The setting up, structure, governance, legal and financial arrangements of the establishment of CL and whether they were adequate from the start
- The effectiveness of the oversight of CL by CCC
- The appropriateness of CCC's approach since October 2017
- Key learning and best practice in managing trusts

## Process

I have spoken to 15 people who have various perspectives, from Cambridge City Council, Cambridge Live and externally. These include current and former CCC staff, councillors, former CL board members and staff and people who understand the arts and not for profit sectors.

I have also reviewed a significant number of documents generated by and for CCC and CL including formal committee reports and decisions, committee work looking at the original concept to internal CL documents, external and internal analyses and correspondence.

Unfortunately, a consensus rarely emerged and I have often had to analyse diametrically opposed views and versions of the same events. In some cases, dates and figures were disputed. The time allocated for this work, the amount of paperwork (some of it missing) and the complexity of the issues do not make clarity and interpretation easy. Where views

differ I have tried to corroborate with other sources. Where I have not been able to establish a clear picture, I have reported opposing perspectives.

I have sought to avoid issues around day to day operations and limit myself to structural, governance, legal and financial issues concentrating on the set up, monitoring and what lessons need to be learnt. However, to get to the point where lessons can be discerned and mistakes avoided next time, there needs to be an understanding of what went wrong. Examine the points that caused the demise of CL results in a long list of lessons to be learnt if and when a similar exercise is carried out.

All conversations I have had were, and will remain, confidential and I have made sure that no individual is named or identified. I also want to emphasise that no one factor, no one organisation and certainly no one individual is responsible for the failure of CL.

I have provided a summary of the principal points of my findings at the end of this report but it may be helpful to lay out at the outset that there were two major reasons for the failure of CL.

- The structure, funding and planning involved in setting up CL was too hurried and so flawed and incomplete. Within these arrangements are the roots of CL's commercial failure.
- However, the demise was not inevitable. With the right people, culture and management, CL could have steered its way through what would have been some choppy waters. But the way CL was run not only did not overcome the weaknesses from the outset, but contributed to its rapid decline and almost to the loss of an outstanding service.

## **1. Reasons and motivation for setting up Cambridge Live**

The motivation within CCC for setting up the trust seems to have been unclear with different people highlighting different (and conflicting) reasons. The ambiguity at the outset and the changing of priorities as the process continued caused confusion throughout the life of the trust and cultivated a lack of consistency in decision making.

The project was born as a way of exploiting VAT regulations but by the time it reached the stage of a paper to the Executive Councillor for Community Wellbeing in March 2014, the three reasons given were:

1. To reduce the subsidy required to fund the services
2. To provide a sustainable basis on which the services can thrive
3. To manage and mitigate the risk to the Council

A subsequent paper in October 2014 added a 'fourth strategic driver' which was to reduce the cost of the council's central infrastructure. Nowhere is there any talk about increasing creativity or innovation.

Those who were subsequently part of CL did not seem to sign up to CCC's reasons and often offered the view that the purpose of the exercise was to 'protect' the arts from the cuts that local authorities increasingly had to make in the face of the government's austerity programme. This does not seem to be mentioned by CCC in any documentation. It is clear that CCC were looking for an improvement in performance and had some ambition for an improved cultural offer but the drive to cut the costs in the agreement made this very hard to achieve.

The need to mitigate risk is understandable but alarm bells should have been ringing for CL if CCC considered there was a risk and that the best solution was to transfer that risk to an untried body and then steadily reduce the funding to it.

The result of these mixed messages and motivations, as well as the lack of a clear vision shared by all, was confusion and a lack of understanding and coherence at every level.

## **2. Establishment of the trust**

### **Preparation**

The transfer of local authority services to a trust is complex and involves legal agreements, service level agreements, TUPE, budgeting, planning and clear communication. It needs commitment and buy in from all those directly involved and the wide range of individuals and organisations who are stakeholders in the services offered.

Different people seem to have different views about whether the agreement and the launch of the trust were done in too much of a hurry and specialist advice was obtained by both sides. But what cannot be denied was that it was not ready. It appears that this was accelerated by the desire to begin operations at the outset of the financial year and that both CCC and CL were in favour of the rapid timetable.

However, inception to handover involved little more than 12 months. If details are done in too much of a hurry then weaknesses will emerge at a later stage. Examples of this are the work done on the budget; the lack of a shared long term vision uniting the council and the new trust; the missed opportunity to restructure and recruit staff with skills not present in the existing staff and the lack of co-operation with the wider arts sector locally and regionally. The result was an agreement finally signed on the eve of the launch, planning that was either missing or unsatisfactory and those attending work on the first day unsure if they had a job or not and, when they did have jobs, discovering there was little or no structure, job titles or job descriptions. The chaotic start to the life of CL was an unfortunate harbinger of what was to come.

More time should have been devoted to consultation, planning, finances, staff structure and recruitment and a shadow organisation and board established in good time so that teething problems and transitional issues were identified and addressed prior to the formal launch. Perhaps the fact that the inception and establishment of CL spanned two political regimes and was initially covered by 2 committees added some confusion and lack of clarity to the set up.

### **Remit and breadth of Cambridge Live**

Cambridge enjoys a plethora of arts provision and, despite a diversity of funders, providers and governing bodies, there is a good record of co-operation and joint working. Cambridge Live would have been stronger and more effective if it had worked with the existing providers and community groups and if it had used and learnt from the expertise of the rest of the arts sector. It had a chance to be an organisation rooted in the arts and wider community but it failed to do so. The result was that it lacked the skills to survive and adapt and the ability to call on others for help and guidance. Luton Cultural Services is a good example of a trust set up by the council that has weathered difficult times due to popular support, effective advocacy and community roots.

Although there are other good examples (Brighton being the one that was often used by those advising CCC), there is a question as to whether the range of services run by CL were synergistic and sensible. Running a major venue, a high profile annual festival and one off city events are very different and require different structures, staffing and thinking. Within a multi-functional and multi-faceted operation such as a council this can be achieved but, stripped from the support services and hidden subsidy, this business model is flawed. One wonders why different partnerships and alliances were not considered – with other venues and services. It was put to me that putting this diverse range of operations in one place was ‘tidy’. It may have been tidy from CCC’s point of view but it was not sound from the new organisation’s point of view.

### **3. Business Planning**

By their own admission, the key personnel on the side of the new trust were unsure of the validity of the work behind the paperwork and the merits of the financial agreement and felt pressurised to sign and agree to a tight timetable (see Section 2). The result was unfortunate for both sides with the appointments of the key staff posts being hurried (see Section 4) and the planning and financial agreement inadequately researched and was based on incorrect assumptions.

#### **Reduction in investment**

Local authorities began transferring cultural activity to trusts in the early 1980s. Many lessons have been learned, often the hard way. The first and most important lesson is one that CCC got wrong and is one of the key reasons for the demise of CL. It was principally driven, from the outset, by the drive to save money. This desire and the funding arrangement that was put in place hampered the ability of CL to establish itself on a sound footing.

The advice for any councils considering setting a cultural trust is not to do it if short term revenue savings is the motivation. Indeed, with set up and one off costs included, it is likely to cost extra money for the first few years. In the longer run (say more than 5 years) there may be some savings but this cannot be relied upon. To reduce funding from the outset makes a challenging project more risky.

Removing services from a publicly funded body to a brand new private sector organisation is complicated and fraught with challenges and dangers. A common pattern that one can see over the years is that a trust is established amid hope and optimism but, at an early stage, hits trouble resulting in restructure and management casualties. Radical change is then adopted and the trust is re-aligned by somebody with change management experience and, finally, some degree of stability is reached up to 10 years after being launched. At this point the trust may be strong enough to help reduce the investment from the local authority.

In the light of the experiences of other trusts it can be seen that the agreement, largely drafted by CCC, demanding c£60k reduction in their investment each year was not only hard to fulfil but was a key contributing factor in the demise of CL.

If we take the pattern above it may be that, 3 years in, Cambridge Live was simply experiencing the 'wobble' that could have been expected and in similar cases the local authority would help 'ride it out'. To be fair, CCC were prepared to help out in order to assist CL continue and become more established but CL failed to produce the comfort asked for in terms of a turnaround plan, including cash flow estimates, cost cutting and financial projections and were reluctant to accept help and advice from CCC at a time when they most needed it. Nevertheless the problems throughout CL's time and the scale of the 'wobble' were accentuated by the inadequacies of the set up.

Given these flaws, it is reasonable to ask why the board and management of CL signed up to the agreement. Clearly, due diligence work was deficient in some aspects but the tight timetable mentioned in Section 2 was a factor. As one senior CL person commented 'we had little choice, there was a lot of pressure on us and we had no time to reflect'. Another CL person said that they signed the agreement with 'fingers crossed'. However, I can find no evidence that CL expressed any formal concerns about the credibility and sense of the agreement or whether CCC shared these concerns.

### **Business Plan**

This review did not require a full examination of all the budgetary documents within CL as it focusses on learning for CCC. However, it is apparent that there was a lack of clarity in the processes and decision-making throughout the life of CL. As far as I can see, and this is confirmed by a number of individuals, there was never a proper Business Plan. There was a budget, the agreement and a number of documents outlining priorities and aspirations, but what was desperately needed was a comprehensive Business Plan from the outset setting out vision, mission, values and detailed plans allied to budgets over, at least, a three year period. This would have been the result of consultation, market research and negotiation. Over the three years, other planning documents were produced but none of them of the depth and detail that was needed. This lack of basic business discipline was a major contributor to the demise of CL.

### **Budget**

Of almost equal significance were the financial aspects of the agreement signed in April 2015.

At the outset it should be acknowledged that the budgeted income was achievable and was mostly exceeded during the life of CL and that considerable start-up funds were included in the initial funding in recognition of the difficulties of the transition between local authority and trust. With costs, it is notoriously difficult to assess the value of hidden and overhead support when transferring operations from a large public sector authority to a small trust but the almost unanimous view of CL board members I spoke to was that the financial agreement contained a serious lack of understanding of back of house costs. They maintain that this only became clear well into the contract and, dealing with these problems, proved

to be very expensive. To balance this, the common view from CCC was that, whatever the issues, CL made some unwise decisions and signed a number of unnecessarily expensive contracts.

The problem areas were:

- Support services, IT, professional fees, HR etc
- An underestimation of the cost of utilities and other building costs covered previously in the CCC budget under 'Cultural Facilities'
- The lack of any reserve or contingency

In addition, in 2018 as part of a call for extra CCC funding, CL identified the following gaps that, by implication, were absent from the original budget and should have been part of a Business Plan:

- Unexpected set up costs
- The cost of paying the living wage
- Investment in, and recruitment of, senior managers
- 'Governance and oversight needed money'

With the addition of the tapering of CCC investment outlined in Section 3, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that imprecision and lack of realism in the budget that formed part of the agreement meant that CL was always going to find it hard to survive, never mind prosper. This again emphasises the flaws in the process of drawing up the agreement (Section 2).

However the budget was not the only issue. Problems were compounded by the flawed financial management and reporting undertaken by CL. (See Section 5)

## **4. Structure and culture**

### **Creating a new culture**

For many of those involved, this was an attempt to free the operation from the strictures of local government and so feel free to innovate. This is often the case and there is another common pattern when trusts similar to CL are established. The pattern is that the new organisation makes every effort to be different, looking as little as possible like the council, changing its look, it's branding and begins with a new vision and a 'private sector' rush of adrenaline. There clearly was an attempt to engender this sort of culture but the feeling remains that not enough was done to create a new body with enough energy and impetus from the start. Fresh skills on the staff, experience of start up in a similar situation and time created by having a shadow organisation would have helped with this.

## **Staffing**

Managing services in a multimillion, multi-faceted publicly accountable authority and operating as an independent trust are very different. It needs different skills and experience. Not only the people but the skills, structure and the functions operating within CCC needed to be fully examined well before the launch of the trust. It is highly probable that the need would have been identified to attract new people and restructure the organisation with the sad, but inevitable, loss of some personnel from the existing staff.

Yet this was not done. With a few exceptions, the existing staff were transferred under TUPE to the new trust with the previous structure and responsibilities retained. Decisions on this were taken by CCC and CL but it was almost as if it was an attempt to replicate the existing service with only a change of governance and to do it with as little challenge and fuss as possible.

What should have happened was a wide ranging assessment of what staffing was needed in plenty of time for a restructure undertaken by a shadow organisation prior to the launch with a new structure created and posts identified where new skills and experience were needed. All strategically important posts should have been openly advertised. This particularly applies to the senior management where most existing senior post holders stepped into approximations of their old roles in a completely different organisation. Although they felt restricted by TUPE, both CCC and CL were complicit in not addressing this issue and the problems it created were at the heart of the management issues facing CL throughout out its life.

Without new blood being brought in it appears that a local authority culture remained and the initial use of CCC's central services underlined that many felt that it was no different than before, apart from the governance. The failure to restructure and recruit prior to launch meant that the need for this soon dawned on CL and this painful and expensive work had to be done in the early stages of CL's existence with the inevitable damage to operations, morale and finances. CL's failure to address some of these personnel issues hampered the development of the organisation.

Of course, many of the staff were highly qualified for their various jobs and, in time, more distance between CCC and CL was created and more dynamism was achieved. However, the opportunity was lost to take advantage of the energy and freshness in the first year and build the confidence and the culture that was badly needed.

## 5. Governance and management

### **Councillors on the board**

It seems clear that the councillors 'allocated' to the trust were not always matched for their experience and interests. It is instructive that there is praise for the performance of the two councillors who were most involved in the final year of the trust and did much to recognise the problems and transition the CL 'business' back to CCC. It surely no coincidence that these two councillors had extensive business experience.

The question must be asked whether the council appointees should necessarily be councillors? The problems of the different skill sets of councillors as well as changing political fortunes mean that it might make more sense to appoint individuals, who are not councillors, who can add to the external organisation's skill set. However, whatever the benefits of this there would be the loss of the accountability and understanding that is developed if councillors are the appointees.

There is praise from both sides for the input, enthusiasm and support that all the councillors brought to the board but the turnover of councillors on the trust was not helpful to good governance. It is often the case that it needs at least 12 months for a director or trustee to settle in and understand before s/he can begin to be effective. There were two 'places' on the board for councillors and, for the brief period of CL's operational existence, there were 7 councillors filling these two places. One option to deal with this is for appointees to sit on the trust for a longer period – perhaps 3 years – allowing them to gain the understanding that comes from continuity.

### **Role of the of board**

It is questionable whether, for much of the time, the board's monitoring and governing role over CL was adequately exercised. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. One might be the issue of councillor continuity discussed above and another is that a board of 11 seems to be too large for such an organisation (in fairness, the political requirements of the council requiring a nomination from each for the two major parties meant the board had to be 11 to avoid breaching Charity Commission rules).

In addition, it is not entirely clear if the board was made up of the appropriate skills and experience. What was often commented on is the relative lack of financial acumen amongst the majority of the board which may explain why no early alarms bells were rung when the figures were not adding up.

Finally, the board is often only as good as its senior management and there is no doubt that the monitoring and reporting submitted was substandard and the minutes reveal how rarely the financial performance of the organisation was discussed or the worrying escalation of costs were raised. A more involved board with greater financial management skills should have been asking questions at a much earlier stage. The result was the lethal combination of deteriorating finances and a board who were unaware of the fact. Even as the situation worsened, the board seemed more concerned with income generation, securing more funding from CCC and planning negotiations for the post 2020 contract than dealing with runaway costs.

### **Management of Cambridge Live**

Whatever the weaknesses in the way CL was set up, the issues around governance and the difficulties they would inevitably face were compounded by fundamental weaknesses in the management systems. Faced with the need to change the culture of the organisation, raise significant extra income and funding, control costs and build a cohesive team capable of running quality venues and events, the personnel, systems and leadership were not up to the job. This issue was compounded by the failure to recruit a high level financial director who should have been able to produce clearer information, raise the profile of the finances and keep better control of overrunning costs.

As outlined in Section 4, the way CL was structured and the staffing problems made this difficult and the chaos and confusion at an early stage did not help. The biggest issue was the poor management, finance and information systems and this problem persisted. At a time when senior staff and the board most needed regular, accurate data and management accounts, they were not available and, it seems, neither were the financial skills and knowledge to resolve the problem. Equally important it seems neither the senior staff nor the board were willing and able to prioritise and sort out this crucial gap in their knowledge. Most observers within and outside the organisation felt there was a pervasive lack of concern about losing money, both across the trust and in relation to individual projects. Risk management did cover all eventualities but commercial failure was not considered to be likely or possible. This may or may not have been underlined by widely held assumption that CCC would 'always be there' and would be willing and able to 'bale out' CL if necessary. There were rumours mentioned by more than one person that this had been confirmed to some CL board members and staff by senior people at CCC.

The weaknesses in the budget and the lack of a comprehensive Business Plan made the operation difficult but decision making from either the senior management or the board often showed a lack of judgement, insufficient thought and research and key programmes that could have bolstered the trust's activities were never seen through.

Examples are:

- Despite increasing income and raising of sponsorship, relatively small amounts were secured from trusts and foundations.
- There was no serious initiative to achieve NPO status with Arts Council England when this could have opened up other initiatives and provided limited overhead funding.
- Information Technology was overcomplicated and expensive – particularly in relation to finance. Expensive consultants often were used.
- The drive to recruit volunteers never really materialised.
- Education and community work was run but was a missed opportunity to connect with and learn from stakeholder and community groups

- CL's use of consultants and interim staff ballooned to unsupportable levels.
- There was a complete lack of rigour in controlling overspending – particularly staffing costs.
- The taking in of e-Luminate was a poor decision taken for the wrong reasons. It was not the cause of the demise of CL but the costs incurred in dealing with its collapse served to make the situation worse.
- The distressing incident at the Fireworks and Bonfire Night on 4<sup>th</sup> November 2015 had unfortunate consequences and costs – with the investigation and follow up consuming significant amounts of staff time.

## **6. Monitoring and working relations between Cambridge City Council and Cambridge Live**

### **Relations between the two organisations**

Both organisations seemed to fail to recognise the new landscape. CL fiercely defended its impudence but persisted in asking for more subsidy and failed to acknowledge the role of CCC as the principal funder. CCC, on the other hand did not always recognise the autonomy of the new trust. One of the key driving forces behind putting council services out to trust is to provide distance between it and the council with its own separate constitution, status and operations. It was never going to be the case that CCC could maintain the level of monitoring and scrutiny that it has with its own departments. It is not clear that everybody understood the new landscape at the outset.

Relations and monitoring were hindered by growing enmity between the two organisations. There seemed to be a CL organisation-wide culture of hostility towards CCC and a lack of willingness to co-operate. It is hard to be clear exactly why this culture built up but it meant that communication was poor and there was rarely any request for advice, help or support. CL board and staff failed to recognise and acknowledge that CCC were the main funder and regarded them as more of the problem than the solution often claiming concerns that the Charity Commission would be unhappy with the level of 'control' by CCC. There is little evidence that this was a valid concern.

### **Monitoring by councillors**

Monitoring by councillors is not helped by the fact that the Charity Commission regulations clearly state that any individual appointed as a trustee, regardless of who nominated them, must solely work in the interests of the charity. They are not there for the purposes of scrutiny or to speak on behalf of another organisation. The fact that the councillors were often referred to, verbally and in print, as council representatives, reveals a lack of

understanding about their function. This ambiguity can only have impeded any sense of monitoring, with other CL board members and members of staff unwilling and unable to be completely frank with the council nominated board members and, as relations between the two organisations deteriorated, reluctant to make all relevant information available.

Despite the propriety of regarding council nominated board members as part of a monitoring function, this clearly went on. However, it was less than effective as the relevant information and intelligence was not always made available or passed back to CCC. A key reason for this is highlighted in Section 5 above. The number of council nominated board members that served during the 3.5 years militated against consistency and the individuals concerned garnering and developing enough understanding about their role, the nature of trust and, most importantly, the key strategic and operational challenges facing CL.

In addition, as outlined above in Section 5, the attributes of the council nominated board members may not always been apposite. They were often political appointments based on availability and willingness rather than on an appropriate and useful set of skills that could contribute positively to the board's governance.

Nevertheless, given the many problems outlined above, I did not find any evidence of a failure of councillors to fulfil their roles properly. All seemed to support the CL board and staff and were behind the project. Despite their primary responsibility to CL, they were asked to monitor but, like everybody else, they were confused and frustrated by the information coming from the CL staff and were not in a position to provide detailed and useful intelligence. Towards the end of CL, a number of key councillors, now seeing the problem, played a very useful role in ensuring there was an orderly close down and a good transition back to CCC.

### **Relations with officers**

Throughout the existence of CL, relations with the CCC departments and officers were always going to be important - even after CL took out external contracts for professional services rather than use CCC services. These relationships were never as cordial and productive as they might have been and this hindered monitoring.

The 'buy in' from Council departments was poor. CCC councillors and senior officers should have made clear across the organisation that, though there had been a change in governance, there was to be full co-operation with the new organisation. However, those on the CL side report that, in the CCC departments other than Community Services, there was a lack of willingness to co-operate. A number of those I spoke to had distressing tales of a wilful lack of understanding and co-operation and difficult and aggressive meetings. This was, in part, the cause of the growing enmity between CCC and CL and it is regrettable that these incidents were not reported and addressed at an early stage.

### **Monitoring by officers**

It does not seem to be the case that the monitoring by CCC officers was in some way deficient. There were regular meetings between CCC and CL but the information was poor and the spirit of co-operation lacking. The day to day poor relationship between the two

organisations highlighted above was an impediment to a productive working relationship and, when the problems became clear, the CCC officers were professional and diligent in the actions they took. Meanwhile CL was unable or unwilling to provide the information and plans CCC correctly required for further investment - a comprehensive rescue plan and the appointment of a turnaround manager.

Ultimately, the nature of an independent governance structure means that close monitoring of CL was difficult and not always appropriate. The other problems within CL and between CL and CCC plus the structural, legal financial impediments compounded the difficulties. Within this context, I do not think there was a significant breakdown in monitoring. CCC's monitoring was reasonable given the operational and organisational barriers in their way and, once the scale of the problem became clear in early 2018, I feel their actions and energy were appropriate and thought through. The offer by CCC to support CL in the short term was fair and reasonable and only thwarted by CL's inability to produce information to provide security and comfort for CCC.

Although not part of the this report's brief I should say that, having got to the point they reached in late 2018, the decision to save CL from insolvency was the correct one – avoiding the public, political and financial fallout that would have resulted from CL's insolvency. In the wake of the move back to CCC, the efficient and smooth transition and maintenance of quality service to the public is a testament to the commitment and professionalism of all those involved.

## **Executive Summary**

These points are not taken verbatim from the report but represent a coalescence of the principal points. Important and further detail can be found in the longer sections.

1. The CCC rationale behind the establishment of CL was not completely clear from the outset.
2. Greater consultation within the city and the sector should have taken place, possibly resulting in a differently constituted trust, more cohesive and synergistic and less about taking responsibilities and risk from CCC.
3. A major reason for failure was the agreement setting up CL – in particular the recurring reduction in the CCC annual investment by over £60k each year beginning in Year 1.
4. The financial agreement between the two organisations was flawed, particularly underestimating the overhead costs required. A fully costed Business Plan was never produced.
5. These weaknesses were indicative of CL not being ready to launch. Further time should have been taken to put a shadow board and organisation in place and more attention given to the initial CL staffing and operations.
6. More effort was needed to create a dynamic culture for CL from the outset - including open recruitment for all senior staff.
7. CL's financial control and monitoring was poor from the outset and should have been addressed sooner.
8. Too many councillors were appointed to the board for one year only – longer appointments would have provided greater continuity.
9. The CL board was too large, had insufficient depth of financial acumen and paid insufficient attention to financial control and monitoring. These issues were never addressed.
10. An unnecessary and unhelpful hostility was allowed to build up between the two organisations. This could and should have been addressed earlier by both organisations at a senior level.
11. Councillors did not fail to monitor CL adequately. It is not their duty to do so and, like the rest of the board, they were largely unclear and uninformed about the underlying finances.

12. Officers were equally kept in the dark about the CL finances and did all they could, given that CL was an independent body. Once the scale of the problem became clear the CCC officers were swift to act and address the issues as best they could.
13. From the outset there was a lack understanding and clarity in recognising the tensions inherent in a relationship between an independent trust and its largest funder who were publically accountable and the previous operator of the service.

**Mark Taylor**  
**20th September 2019**

## **Appendix**

### **Individuals spoken to**

#### **Cambridge City Council officers and ex officers**

Antoinette Jackson	Chief Executive
Suzanne Hemingway	Strategic Director
Debbie Kaye	Head of Community Services
Jane Wilson	Arts and Events Manager
Liz Bisset	ex Strategic Director

#### **Current or ex Councillors (all served as Board members on Cambridge Live at some point)**

Sian Reid  
Anna Smith  
Valerie Holt  
Jeremy Benstead

#### **Cambridge Live Board and staff**

Sara Garnham	ex Chair
Steve Bagnall	ex CEO
Elaine Midgley	ex Business Development Director

#### **Others**

Nick Dodds	Consultant FEI
Hedley Swain	Area Director, South East, Arts Council England
Amy Vaughan	Senior Relationship Manager, Arts Council England